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Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization:
Mexico in the 1970s
ABSTRACT
Thispaper is an empirical study of the Banco de Mexico's monetary
policy during the 1970s. In particular, it studies the Mexican monetary
authority's response to the liquidity effects of balance—of—payments dis—
equilibria and the extent to which capital mobility undermined monetary
control. Estimates of a Banco de Mexico reaction function suggest that
the Mexican central bank attempted to sterilize reserve flows through
offsetting movements in domestic credit, at least over the second half of
the decade. This finding suggests that estimates of the capital—account
response to domestic credit expansion should be derived from a structural
model, and we accordingly estimate an aggregative three—equation model of
Mexican financial markets. The paper distinguishes between the short—run
or one—quarter capital—account offset and a hypothetical long—run offset
that would obtain under instantaneous asset—market adjustment. The model
implies that, depending on the method of monetary expansion, between 30
and 50 percent of an expansion in domestic credit was offset by capital
outflow in the same quarter. The implied long—run offsets range from
50 to 76 percent. These offset coefficients indicate that the Banco de
Mexico's monetary control was exercised at a substantial cost in terms of
reserve volatility.
Robert E. Cumby Maurice Obstfeld
International Monetary Fund Visiting Scholar, International
Washington, D.C. 20431 Finance I)ivision
Room 2246—C
(202) 477—3365 Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
Washington, D.C. 20551
(202) 452—2067CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE SCOPE FOR STERILIZATION:
Mexico in the 1970s
Robert E. Cumby Maurice Obstfeld
International Monetary Fund Columbia University
This paper studies the interaction between Mexico's capitalaccount
and domestic credit policy during the decade 1970—1980. It seeks in
particular to measure the offset to monetary policy due to
interest—sensitive capital flows, and, in doing so, is careful to account
for the potential estimation bias introduced by central—bank sterilization
activities. The empirical record suggests that the instantaneous
capital—account offset to monetary policy, while substantial, was less than
complete in the 1970s. The Banco de Mexico's short—run control of the
monetary base allowed it to attempt the complete sterilization of foreign
reserve movements, at least over part of the decade.
Empirical studies of offsetting capital flows have concentrated
almost exclusiveLy on the industrialized, North Atlantic economies.' But
the impact of capital mobility on domestic monetarymanagement is of great
importance for Mexico, which has long allowed relatively unrestricted
external asset trading, and for other industrializing economies (suchas
Chile) which have recently removed impediments to capital—account
transactions. Mexican authorities fear that reserve inflows associated with
increasing oil exports will place upward pressure on domestic prices and
This research was carried out with the help of financialsupport from the
National Science Foundation. We acknowledge with thanks the helpful
suggestions of Pedro Aspe, Jacob Frenkel, Pentti Kouri, and Kenneth Rogoff.
All errors and opinions are our own. The views expressed hereare not
necessarily those of the institutions with which we are affiliated.—2—
leadto an overvalued exchange—rate and Limirit ion of trad it nal
exportsectors (see Ortiz and Solis (1979)); teri1L'ton, if fcaible,
couldreduce these inflationary pressures in the short run. Similarly,
Argentina experienced substantial capital inflows and real exchange—rate
appreciation as a result of the disinflation policy it pursued in the
late l970s. Sterilization might mitigate these problems during the transi-
tionto lower inflationrates in countries (such as Uruguay) following
strategiessimilar to Argentina's.
Broadlyspeaking, the econometric approaches taken in the
industrialized—country studies of the capital—account offset may be
classifiedeither as "reduced—form" (Porter (1972),Kouri and Porter (1974),
Girton and Roper (1977)) or "structural" (Herring and Marston (1977),
Obstfeld (l980a)).2 In this paper, we apply the structural approach to
the recent Mexican evidence. This strategy avoids the simultaneous—
equations bias that may distort reduced—form offset estimates in the presence
of a sterilization rule.
An additional feature of our econometric technique deserves mention.
Along with the standard two—stage least squares estimates of the Mexican
structural equations, we present estimates based on the two—step two—stage
least squares procedure proposed by Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1981).
The theoretical advantages of the latter estimator are discussed in con-
text below.
The plan of the paper is as follows.
Section I distinguishes between offsetting capital movements and
systematic sterilization as possible causes of an empirical negative
correlation between capital inflows and increases in the domestic source—3—
comnonent of the monetary base. We briefly review the redced—foni'
approach to the offset in the light of possible feedback from the balance
of payments to the central bank's domestic assets.
Section II describes our empirical measure of domestic credit
expansion, and estimates a quarterly Banco de Mexico reaction function
relating changes in the domestic source component of the high—powered money
stock to the balance of payments and the government's borrowing requirement.
We find that reserve flows were a significant determinant of domestic
credit movements in the l970s, and are unable to reject the hypothesis that
sterilization of reserve flows was complete, at least over the second half
of the decade.
Section III estimates the parameters of a small, aggregative model
of Mexico's money market and capital account. The underlying portfolio—
balance model of the capital account assumes that peso—denominated non—
money assets and covered foreign assets are imperfect substitutes in
portfolios, and allows for the gradual adjustment of portfolio shares to
their desired values. The empirical results imply that, depending on how
the increase in the money sunoly was effected, anywhere between 30 and 50per
cent of an expansion in domestic credit was offset bycapital outflow in
the same quarter. The offset would have been higher had asset markets
adjusted fully within one quarter.
Section IV briefly discusses the extent to which a systematic relationship
between domestic credit movements and the futures premium on foreign
exchange might alter the results of Section III. The data reveal a pronounced
relation between the futures premium and lagged deviations from purchasing—
power parity. We argue that expectations concerning possible peso
devaluation were the major determinant of the premium.3—4—
Section V contains some concluding remarks. An appendix describes
the construction of the data series employed in this study.
I. Steriliz at ion a nd theCp—AccountOf f set
When the exchange rate is pegged and international capital movements
are sensitive to interest—rate differentials between countries, the capital—
account response to domestic monetary measures diminishes their effect on
the monetary base. An expansion of domestic credit, say, exerts downward
pressure on domestic borrowing costs, inducing a reduction in net foreign
indebtedness and a central—bank reserve loss that offsets some fraction of
the intended increase in the base.When domestic and foreign securities
are perfectly substitutable and portfolios adjust instantaneously, this
offset is complete and immediate: the central bank possesses no control
over the domestic money stock.
Both imperfect substitutability between interest—bearing assets
of different currency denomination and imperfect mobility of capital between
financial centers may afford a central bank some short—run monetary inde-
pendence. Neither necessarily enables the central bank to peg the price
level or money supply indefinitely (see Obstfeld (l980b)). Imperfect
substitutability can arise, for example, if various risks render stochastic
the perceived return on domestic assets. When this is so, the desired
portfolio share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth is an increasing
function of the home interest rate, and the central hani: can influence
thisinterest rate (and so, the demand for money) by varying the
stock of outside domestic currency debt available to private wealth
owners.5Costs associated with rapid portfolio adjustment may allow—5—
internationalinterest—rate arbitrage to occur only over time. Thus,
imperfectcapital mobility affords the monetary authority an independent
means of temporarily influencing domestic credit conditions. The model
ofMexico estimated below allows for both possible sources of short—run
interest—rate independence in the presence of international asset trade.
Theoffset to monetary policy gives rise, empirically, to a negative
correlation between the capital—account surplus and increases in the domestic
component of the base. Figure 1 plots the change in Banco de Mexico's reserves
against the seasonally—adjusted change in domestic credit, and is suggestive
of such a negative correlation in the Mexican case.6 But the absolute
magnitude of this correlation, by itself, is not evidence of a powerful
capital—account offset. Central banks frequently take advantage of any
short—run monetary control they possess to sterilize reserve flows. Their
attempts to divorce the balance of payments from the high—powered money
supply introduce an additional source of systematic negative correlation
between domestic credit expansion and capta1 inflows. A sterilization
rule increases reserve volatility, but can successfully counteract balance—
of—payments influences on the money supply in the short run when the
capital—account offset is incomplete. Under sterilization, there is a
systematic contemporaneous feedback from the balance of payments to the
domestic assets of the central bank. These two variables are jointly,
endogenously determined by the preferences or private asset holders and
themonetary policy reaction function of the central bank.
Attemptsto measure the offset coefficient ——thefraction of any
domestic credit increase offset by capital outflow over the relevant time


































































































































































































































 view the domestic source component of the base as a predetermined variable
for purposes of estimation. Studies adopting this assumption produce
estimates of the offset which reflect the central bank's policy as well as
the true capital—account response to domestic credit expansion, but they
erroneously ascribe the computed correlation exclusively to the latter.
Thisis true in part icular of the "reduced—form" approaches to the offset
coefficient, which use ordinary least squares to regress the capital—account
surpluson the contemporaneous increase in domestic credit, the current
account surplus, and the exogenous determinants of changes in the external
asset position and the domestic interest rate (usually the contemporaneous
change in the foreign interest rate and home income).7 When the monetary
authority pursues a sterilization policy, the resulting least-squares
estimate of the domestic credit variable's coefficient is not a consistent
estimate of the offset coefficient, for this variable is correlated with the
capital—flow equation's disturbance term. The bias this correlation imparts
to the estimated offset is discussed by a number of authors, including Magee
(1976), Girton and Roper(1977), Murray(1979) and Ohstfeld (1980a).
In the next section we estimate a Banco de Mexico monetary policy
reaction function. The results provide strong evidence that the Mexican
authorities pursued a systematic policy of full sterilization during at least the
second half of the 1970s. To avoid the bias this might introduce into
"reduced—form"results, we then estimate a small structural model of
Mexico's financial markets. This allows us to calculate estimates of the
offset coefficient by tracing the effect on the stock of net external claims
of increases in the monetary base. The structural model allows for gradual—7
asset—marlet adjustment, and thus allows us to distinguish empirically between
the consequences of imperfect substitutability and imperfect mobility of
capital. Accordingly, we report estimates of both the short—run or
one—quarter offset coefficient, and the long—run offset coefficient. The
former gives the fraction of a monetary expansion reversed by capital
outflow in the same quarter on the assumption that output and the price
level are predetermined; the latter is a hypothetical construct measuring
what the short—run offset would be if asset holdings could adjust
immediately to their long—run desired levels.
It. The Banco de Mexico's Reaction Function
In this section we examine the extent to which the Banco de Mexico
systematically neutralized the monetary effects of its foreign—exchange
intervention. To begin, we describe the construction of a domestic credit
policy variable which summarizes the effects of a variety of instruments
available to the central bank, We next estimate a central—bank reaction
function relating the level of this policy variable to a number of
macroeconomic variables. The central finding is that a policy of systematic
sterilization appears to have been followed at least during the second half
of the l970s. Not surprisingly, we find also that credit policy is
influenced strongly by the need to finance the government's deficit, and
that seasonal variation in liquidity preference is accommodated by the
monetary authority.—8—
To construct a comprehensive measure of monetary policy suited to the
recent Mexican experience, two important adjustments of the published
domestic credit series are required. The first involves the treatment of
decisions to monetize changes in the peso value of the Banco de Mexico's
international reserves. The second incorporates the effects of variations
in the reserve requirements imposed on private banks.
The peso value of the Banco de Mexico's foreign reserves may change
for two reasons other than actual foreign—exchange intervention. The first
of these is fluctuations in the market price of gold. Since the second
quarter of 1976, the Banco de Mexico has revalued its gold holdings daily to
reflect prevailing market prices. As a result, the dollar value of gold
holdingsincreased by more than 500per cent between 1975 and 1979, while
physicalgoldholdings declined by 45 per cent over the same period.8 A
second source of reserve change in the absence of balance—of—payments dis—
equilibrium is exchange—rate variation. When the peso—dollar rate was
altered abruptly jn 1976, Banco de Mexico experienced a substantial capital
gain, in peso terms, on its holdings of foreign—currency denominated assets.
Devaluation, like the gold—price increases, inflates the book value of
reserves.
The decision to monetize such capital gains as a means of government
finance is entirely discretionary. The alternative is the creation of a
fictitious accounting liability that offsets the increase in the peso value
of central—bank foreign assets without directly increasing the high—powered
money stock. Monetization is thus completely analogous to an increase in
the domestic assets of the central bank, even though it presupposes a rise
in the peso value of the banks's foreign assets, It should be included in
any measure of domestic credit change and excluded when calculating foreign—9—
reservechanges.9
Minimum reserve requirements for private banks were varied several
times during the 1970s, and these changes, too, should enter into a summary
measure of domestic credit policy. We incorporate them by assuming that
policy makers think in terms of an adjusted monetary base, that is, a base
adjusted to reflect the effect of average reserve ratio changes on the
volumeofdemand deposits it supports. (Weabstract from currency in
circulation.) Theadjusted base at time t, BAtS is given by
BA =q0t —B
where qisthe base—period average reserve ratio,the current reserve
ratio, and Bt the unadjusted base, measured in pesos.1° BAt is just the
base that would support a money supply equal to B/q were the average
reserve ratio at its base level q0
LettingFACBdenote the change in central—bank foreign assets
over period t (excluding valuation changes) and ADACB the change in
central—bankdomestic assets over period t(including monetized capital
gainson foreign reserves), we may write
BA -BA * t




(B + AB) '_1B/q
*
ABt
is the increase in the unadjusted base that would, at reserve ratio
bringabout the same rise in the volume of demand deposits supported— 10—
byBt as a reduction of the reserve ratio from to Thequantity
(/q1) ABt appearing on the right-hand side of (1) thus measures the
impact of the reserve ratio change on the adjusted base.
Identity (1) suggests a natural measure of overall domestic credit
policy:
—q * t—ADACB+'oAB . - t-—t (2)
We take AMP to be the dependent variable in the Banco de Mexico's monetary
reaction function, and turn next to a discussion of the appropriate
independent variables.
A central—bank reaction function should allow for response to a
number of factors in addition to the balance of payments. Monetary policy,
as defined by (2), may respond also to real output fluctuations, to changes
in Mexico's international competitiveness as measured by the real exchange
rate, and to seasonal fluctuations in money demand. Further, in the
Mexican case, the government's borrowing requirement is a major factor
influencing domestic credit creation. We therefore specified a reaction
function of the form:
AMPt= a +a1(q0/q i)AFACB+ a2(q Iq i)GOVBOR+ a3p1
3
+ a42n(y1/y2) +.a4+Di+ u1. (3)
i=l
In (3), GOVBOR is the government deficit, pn(ePUS/PNex) the log of the real
exchange rate, y the index of real industrial production, and Di a
seasonal dummy for the th quarter. PUS and PMex are the U.S. and Mexican
price levels, while e is the peso price of U.S. dollars.1'— 11—
Whenthe central bank pursues a systematic sterilization policy,
a1 is negative. If a1= —1, the monetary authorityseeks to neutralize
all reserve flows through offsetting movements in domestic credit:
sterilization is complete. A positive value of a1 indicates that monetary
policy is aimed at external balance.
The role of government deficit finance is particularly important
inMexico.'2 In general, that part of the government deficit not fi-
nanced through external borrowing must be financed through the domestic
bankingsystem. (The Banco de Mexico, since 1955, has induced private
banks to hold a large portion of the central government's debt by allowing
certain debt holdings to serve as required reserves.)
Thus, we expect the coefficient a2 in (3) to be positive and close to
1, reflecting the importance of the banking system in financing the
deficit.Because public external borrowing also plays an important role
in financing the government deficit, we expect a2 to be less than 1.
If the monetary authority adopts a competitiveness target, the
coefficient a3 of the lagged real exchange rate should be positive.
Thus, when domestic prices rise more quickly than exchange—rate adjusted
foreign prices, credit policy becomes more restrictive. Ifmonetarypolicy
isused to lean against cyclical activity fluctuations, a4 is negative.
Finally, as the majorS seasonal influence on money demand is the
fourth—quarterincrease, the coefficients of the seasonal dummies should be
negative.— 12—
Theresults of estimating the reaction function appear in Table I.
The endogeneity of the balance of payments makes necessary an instrumental—
variables estimation technique, and two different ones were employed. The
first of these was Fair's (1970) version of two—stage least squares (2SLS),
which incorporates a correction for first—order serial dependence in the
equation's disturbance. The second was the two—step two-stage least-squares
(2s2sLs) procedure proposed by Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1981). An
advantageof 2S2SLS is that the asympotic distribution theory ituses to
calculateparameterestimates' standard errors is valid under assumptions
less restrictive than those adopted by Fair.'3 But both estimation
methods should yield consistent parameter estimates in the present case.
Initially, the specification (3) was used; the results are reported
as equations (A) and (C) in Table 1.Both estimates give the
competitiveness term the expected positive sign, but they provide no
evidence that counter—cyclical considerations influence domestic credit
policy. Equations (B) and CD) present estimates of a reaction function from
which the statistically insignificant competitiveness and cyclical variables
have been excluded. The remaining coefficients exhibited relatively little
sensitivity to this exclusion restriction.
The accommodation of seasonal money—demand shifts is apparent in all
the estimates, with a strong seasonal expansion in the fourth quarter.'4
The government borrowing requirement is highly significant in all the
regressions, indicating that roughly 70 to 80 per cent of the deficit is




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mostimportantly, the balance—of—payments coefficient is negative
and has a marginal significance level exceeding 95 per cent in all versions
of the reaction function. Although a1 is always smaller than —1, it is more
than one standard error away from —1 only in equation (D).Thus, one cannot
strongly reject the hypothesis a1=—l. The data suggest that the Banco de
Mexico attempted to control the money stock through full neutralization of
reserve flows.
To investigate the stability of the reaction function, we split our
sample into two sub—periods, 1971:3 —1975:4and 1976:1 —1979:4.In the
first sub—period there appeared to be no significant relationship between
domestic credit policy and any of the explanatory variables (other than
dummies). The relationships estimated over the second sub—period were
-
similarto those reported in Table I:
(Fair) A1P =58.0-1.525(q0 )FACB + .646 ( )GOVBQR-104.4Dl
(42.9) (0.733) iii1 (.435)q1 (82.8)
—30.0 D2 —99.7D3
(9.8) (81.3)
=—0.92 SE =13.0 R" =0.838
(0.09)
(2S2SLS) =49.9-1.425 )FACB + 0.506 ()COVBOR-87.0Dl
(128.2) (0.218) q1 (0.209) q_1 (260.0)
—28.3 D2 —80.3D3
- (3.7) (256.0)
=-0.90 SE =10.1 =0.842
(0.45)
These results suggest that sterilization was a more important factor in
monetary policy during the second half of the 1970s than during thefirst
half.15 The finding is consistent with the fact that the range of monetary
tools available to the Banco de Mexico broadened considerably after1975.16We conclude that part of the observed negative correlation between
changes in the domestic and foreign source components of the base is likely
to be due to official sterilization policy. An implication is that domestic
credit policy responds to the balance of payments, and should not be treated
as an exogenous factor in estimating the capital—account offset coefficient.
III. A Structural Model_of Asset Markets
In this section we estimate a sinall, aggregative portfolio—balance
model of Mexican financial markets. The model allowsthe calculation of
both the short—run and long—run offset coefficients.It consists of three
equations, a demand equation for the netexternal liabilities of the
Mexican private sector, a money demand equation, and a moneysupply equa-
tion. All equations were estimated by two—stageleast squares (with Fair's
autoregressive correction when necessary) and bythe 2S2SLS procedure. A
list of the instruments used is provided in a note toTable 2.
Both the money and external liability demand equationsrelate desired
asset holdings to the expected return on foreign assets.An important
component of this return is the expected depreciationof the peso relative
to foreign currency. The presence of a large,discrete devaluation of the
peso in 1976:3 poses a problem,for it is unlikely that the devaluation
was completely unanticipated, or that anticipationsof exchange rate move-
ments were a minor determinant of capital flowsin 1976—77. Indeed,
Figure 1 presents striking evidence thatthe devaluation of 1976 was pre-
ceded by a sizable anticipatory outflow of capital.
To capture the impact of exchange rate expectations,we used the
premium on three—month peso futures as an explanatoryvariable in our
empirical equations.17 This premium doesreflect the anticipation of a—15--
devaluation for several quarters preceding 1976:3, but was always substan—
tially smaller than the realized devaluation.
Each equation is now discussed in turn. At the end of the section,
the implied offset coefficients are calculated.
1.Net foreign liabilities
We assume that the real peso value of the desired stock of net
external liabilities, eFd/PMex, may be written as a function of domestic
and foreign interest rates, domestic real income, and domestic real
wealth:
eFd=(r,r* +f,y, W/PMex) +u2. (4)
PMex
In (4), r is the domestic interest rate, r* the foreign rate, f the pre—
18
mium on peso futures, and W nominal Mexican wealth. We assume that
Mexican participants comprise a sufficiently small share of the world
financial market that the foreign interest rate may be taken as exogenous.
In addition, we assume that foreign holdings of peso—denominated assets
are negligible, so that we may ignore the effects of foreign income and
wealth. To incorporate thepossibilityof imperfect capital mobility,
we suppose that agents need not adjust portfolio shares instanteneously
to their full optimum level, but instead succeed in making a fraction




where F is the actual stock of net foreign liabilities, measured in dollars.—16—
Combiningequations (4) and (5) and linearizing, we obtain the equa—
tion to be estimated,
e
=
b0+ b1 +b2r + b3(r +ft) +b4yt +
P ext Mext_l
b5Wt/PMext ÷ 2t' (6)
where b1 =1—and £ 2t =Xu2t. A rise in the home interest rate induces
an inflow of capital or an increase in net external liabilities, so b2 >0.
Similarly, b3 < 0. An increase in domestic real income augments the trans—
actions demand for money and causes a decline in desired holdings of
foreign assets, so b4 > 0. Finally, an increase in domestic wealth
leads to a reduction in external liabilities. Thus, b5 <0.
The results of estimating (6) are reported in Table 2.19 They provide
evidence that capital flows are quite sensitive to the domestic interest
rate even in the short run. The two techniques yield very similar para-
meter estimates, although those obtained by 2S2S2S appear to be more
precise. All interest rate coefficients have the expected sign and are
significant at the 95 per cent level. Equation (13), for example, suggests that a
100 basis point rise in the home interest rate, all else equal, induces a capital
inflow of 1.2 billion real pesos in the same quarter, while an equal in-
crease in the covered foreign rate induces a 0.25 billion real peso Out-
flow. Both estimates of the adjustment parameterare near 0.7. Again
using equation (B), the long—run capital inflow occasioned by a 100 basis
point rise in r is 3.9 billion real pesos, while the outflow following an





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The wealth variable has the anticipated sign and is significant at
the 95percent level inbothequations. Equation (B) suggests that
approximately15 per cent of an increase in wealth is allocated to net
external assets within one quarter. The long—run portfolio share is 50 per cent.
2.Money demand
The demand for narrowly—defined real money (Ml) balances is assumed
to depend on the domestic and foreign covered interest rates, real income,
and real wealth. Thus, long—run desired money holdings may be written as
1d =A(r,r* + f, y, W/PMex) +u3.
PHex
Invoking the partial adjustment mechanism and linearizing as before, we
obtain the empirical specification,
Mt =
C0+C11'1t—l + c2 r + c3(r + +c4y + c5Wt/PMext
PMext PHex —l
+ £3t, (7)
where 1 —c1is again the adjustment parameter. As usual, we expect C2,
C3 < 0, C4, C5 >0.
The results of estimating (7) appear in Table30 As before, the two—
stage least—squares (2SLS) and the 2S2SLS estimates are quite similar.
Table 3 reports two versions of the money—demand equation. In (A) and (B)
we estimate the money demand equation without imposing coefficient con-
straints while in (C) and (D), the two rate—of—return coefficients are
constrained to be equal.In neither case is the constraint rejected by



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rates is significant at the95Percent level. In the unconstriid equa-
tion only thecoefficienton the foreign interest rate is significant.
The adjustment of real balances to long—run desired levels is esti-
mated to be approximately 20 per cent per quarter. Equation (D), for example,
suggests that a 100 basis point increase in either rate of return leads to a 0.3
billion peso decrease in real money demand in the same quarter and a 1.4
billion peso decrease in real money demand In the long run.
As expected, an increase in real income raises real money demand.
At thesample means of y and N/PIIex, the income elasticity of money demand
derivedfrom equation (D)is0.42 in the short run and 1.94 in the long
run. The empirical equation also contains seasonal dummies, which reveal
a marked seasonality in money demand. It is this seasonal variation that
gives rise to the significant seasonal dummies In the Banco de Mexico's
domestic credit policy function.
3.Money supply
The model's monetary sector includes a money supply function relat-
ing the supply of real Ml to the real monetary base. We assume that the
supply of money by the private banking system may be written as a function
of the monetary base (adjusted for reserve requirements as described in
Section II), and of the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves.W1-ien






Estimates of the parameters of (8) are reported in Table 421 The
coefficient of the real, adjusted base is quite small, reflecting bothTable 4. Mexico: Money Supply (1971:3 —1979:4)1/



















1/ Standard errors are in parentheses. Mean of dependent
variable is 104.8 billion 1975pesos. See footnote in Table 2
for instruments.—19--
highmarginal reserve requirements on demand deposits (in place tlirough-
outthe estimation period) and banks' practice of holding sizable excess
reserves.22 The high interest sensitivity of money supply is also con-
sistent with the existence of significant excess reserves.
4.The offset_coefficient
The estimated coefficients of the structural equations may be used
to calculate the capital—account offset to domestic credit expansion. Two
typesof monetary expansion are considered. The first is an increase in
domestic credit accomplished through an open—market—type asset swap that
leaves private financial wealth unchanged. The second is a helicopter—
type increase in credit that is accompanied by an equal increase in pri-
vate financial wealth. Because our empirical money—demand function d3es not
include domestic wealth as an argument, we would expect the offset associated
withthe latter type of operation to be the greater one. Indeed, were b5
equalto —1,the offset to ahelicopter increase indomestic creditwould
becomplete, even with limited asset substitutability.
In both cases the offset coefficient is (minus) the total derivative
of net foreign liabilities with respect to an increase in DACB. Table
5(a) contains the short—run offset coefficients for both types of credit expansion,
computed from the two sets of parameter estimates using theconstrained money—
demand equations. The short—run offset coefficients imply that, while
substantial, the capital account offset to a monetary expansion was con-
siderably less than complete. At the initial reserve ratio, anywherefror"
30 to 50 per cent of an increase in domestic credit by the Banco de Mexico was
offset by capital outflow within a quarter, with the exact figure depending






















1/ Offset coefficients are calculated
at base period reserve requirements.
The capital—account offset to an open
market_type credit expansion is given by
(q0/q)bd2/((dj—c2) + (q0/q)bd2) (9)








For eampie, in order to achieve a 1 billion peso increase in
the monetary base through outside money creation, a 1.7 to
2billion peso expansion of domestic credit was required. As expected,
the computed offsets to a helicopter—type expansion exceed those to an
open—market type expansion, in both cases by approximately 10petcentage
points.The offset coefficients derived from the Fair's method estimates
exceed those derived from the 2S2SLS estimates. This difference is due t0
the greater domestic—interest—rate sensitivity of capital flows implied
by the former set of estimates.
It is also of interest to calculate the offset in a hypothetical
world in which portfolio adjustment occurs instanteneously. Replacing the
parameters in (9) and (10) with their corresponding long—run values, we
obtain "long—run" offset coefficients in all cases between 50 and 76 per
cent (see Table 5(b)). The computed "long—run"offsets to open—market—
type expansions are in the lower end of this range and those corresponding
to helicopter—type expansions are near 76 per cent. It should be stressed
that we are using the term "long run' in a limited sense to signify only
the complete adjustment of asset stocks to their desired values.
The estimates indicate that the Banco de Mexico could exercise considerable
short—run control over the domestic money stock and domestic credit—market
conditions during the l970s, but only at the cost of high reserve volatility.
IV. Expectations and the Futures Premium
The preceding anlysis, while recognizing the role of the futures
price as an indicator of exchange—rate expectations, has neglected both
the possible influence of the home interest rate on the futures premium
and the endogeneity of expectations. The offset to monetary policy has—21-
been calculated on the assumption that a one—time expansion of domestic
credit leaves the futures premium unchanged.
flow might monetary expansion affect the futures premium? By lower-
ing the domestic interest rate, monetary expansion would induce capital
outflows and, at the initial forward rate, an excess deniand for future
pesos calling for a rise in their equilibrium price. As an appreciation
of the peso on the futures market discourages capital outflow, the offset
coefficient would be lower than calculated in the previous section if
covered interest arbitrage were incorporated into the model.
Speculative transactions are also an important determinant of the
futures price however, and the activities of the speculators would tend
to raise the offset coefficient calculated in Section III. Monetary
expansion raises the likelihood of devaluation by reducing the central
bank's international reserves and encouraging domestic expenditure.
Speculators would respond by selling the peso forward, thus enhancing
the profitability of capital outflows.
Theoretically, the net effect on the futures prices of these two
types of activity——interest arbitrage and speculation——is indeterminate.
But as an empirical matter, we could find no strong evidence that contem-
poraneous domestic interest rates affected the futures premium during the
1970s. Expectations regarding the future level of the exchange rate did
seem to be an important determinant of the futures premium, however. In
particular, lagged deviations from purchasing power parity exerted a
persistent and strong effect on the futures premium, with lagged real
exchange—rate appreciation leading to forward depreciation of the peso.—22—
Letting pn(ePUS/PMex) again denote the natural logarithm of
the real exchange rate, we estimated the following relatiorihip between
the futures premium on dollars, f, and past values of the real exchange
rate between 1974:1 and 1979:4:
=13.998—42.605Pt—]. —33.970Pt-2 —28.013Pt—3
(3.669) (7.344) (10.020) (10.681)
—10.923Pt—4 —21.449Pt—5
(9.987) (7.321)
=0.801 SE =3.497 R2 =0.734
(0.106)
(standard errors are in parentheses). The correlations between the
futures premium and lagged values of the purchasing power parity gap are
extremely high. They suggest that any decline in the com-
petitiveness of Mexican exports occasioned forward speculation against
23
the peso and a rise in the premium on forward dollars.
This strong evidence that expectational factors influenced the
forward premium indicates that our offset estimates probably under-
state the true offset.V. Concluso
This paper has stud]ed the capi tal—accountoffset to monetary
policy faced by the Banco de Mexico duringthe decade 1970—1980. Using
a small structural nìodel of Mexican financial markets, we found that roughly
30 to 50 per cent of a domestic—credit increase leaked away through the
capital account within a quarter, with the precise figure depending on the
methodof domestic—credit expansion adopted. This incomplete offset was
due to imperfect mobility of capital as well as to imperfect substitutability
betweenpeso—denominated assets andassets denominated in foreign currencies.
Theoffset coefficientwould have been approximately 50 to 65 per cent
higherunder instantaneous portfolio adjustment.
These findings imply that the Mexican central bank possessed some
degree of short—run control over the monetary base in spite of the fixity
of the exchange rate. While short—run monetary control implies an
ability to neutralize the liquidity effects of transitory reserve fluctua-
tions, it does not imply an ability to resist the adjustments necessary
to eliminate sustained disequilibria in the balance of payments. Con-
clusions as to the scope for long—run monetary control cannot be drawn
from our partial—equilibrium financial—sector model, which
neglects the current—account effects of international wealth flows
and changes in home borrowing costs.
Estimates of a Banco de Mexico reaction function provided strong
evidence of official sterilization activities during the 1970s. Although
the reaction function exhibited some instability when estimated over
sub—periods of the decade, the Banco de Mexico seems to have pursued a
policy of full neutralization of reserve movements, at least since early— /4 —
1976.The pursuit of sterilization under conditions of sulistantial
capital—account sensitivity helped give rise to periods of considerable
reserve volatility during the decade under study.—25—
APPEND X
The following data were employed In this study:
B: High—powered money in billions of pesos. The series is the sum of
currency and the reserve deposits of deposit banks in the Banco de Mexico,
including securities held at the Banco de Mexico in fulfillment of reserve
requirements.Source: IndicadoresEconomicos,variousissues, for data
from 1974:1 to 1979:4. From 1970:4 to 1973:4, currency in circulation is
taken from Indicadores Economicos and bank reserves from Informe Anual.
BA; Adjusted stock of high powered money, equal to (q/q)B.
D1,D2,D3: Seasonal dummies taking the value of one in the jth quarter
(1=1,2, 3) and zero in other quarters.
ADACB: Change in Central Bank domestic assets. Calculated as
AFACB. Included are monetized capital gains on international reserves.
e: End—of—period exchange rate, in pesos per dollar. Source: Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS), line ae.
f:End—of—quarter premium on peso futures for delivery three months
forward, at annual rate. The premium is set at zero prior to 1974:2.
Source: InternationalMoney_Market_Yearbook, various issues.
F: Private Mexican net external liabilities, in billions of dollars,
calculated as the cumulated STCF +LTCF.
t\FACB: Change in reserves of the Banco de Mexico, excluding valuation
changes. Calculated as ett\Rt.
GOVBOR; The deficit of the Mexican central government, in billions of
pesos. Source:IFS, line 80.
LTCF: Surplus on long—term private capital account, excluding direct
foreign investment, in billions of dollars. Source: Indicadores
Economicos, various issues.—26--
M:Narrowly—defined money Ui, in billions of pesos. Source: Iridicadores
Economicos, and Informe Anual, various issues.
PMex: Mexican CPI, 19751.00. Source: IFS, line 64.
PUS: United States CPI, 19751.00. Source: IFS, line 64.
q: Weighted average reserve requirement. End—of—quarter stocks of vari-
ous domestic and foreign liabilities of the Mexican financial system are
used to weight the marginal reserve requirement for each type of deposit.
When more than one reserve requirement is publIshed for a given type of
deposit (depending, e.g., on location ofthe issuing Institution), some ef-
fort is made to choose the rate which is likely to apply to the majority
of deposits In that category. In addition, the series is adjusted so that
cit =qt—lif no change is made in legislated reserve requirements.
Source: indicadores Econornicos'for 1972:4 —1979:4;Informe Anual for
1970:4 —1972:3.
r: Domestic interest rate. The rate chosen is the gross yield on
financiera bonds for 1971:1 —1973:4and the gross yield on three—month
certificates of deposit from 1974:1 —1979:4.Source: Indicadores
Economicos.
r*: Three—month London Eurodollar rate. Source: IFS, line 60d.
tSR: Change In foreign exchange reserves of the Banco de Mexico, in
billions, of dollars. The reserve series is taken from the balance—of—
payments data in Indicadores Economicos and is based on a constant valua-
tion of gold.
STCF: Short—term private capital—account surplus, in billions of dollars.
The series Includes the errors and omissions in the balance of payments—27—
until 1977:1, when short—term capital flows and errors and omissions were
first published separately. Source: Indicadores Economicos.
y: Mexican index of industral production. Source: IFS, line 66.
YUS: U.S. disposable income (nominal). Source: IFS, line 99a.
W: Mexican financial wealth, calculated as Bt + (—etFt).References
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Footnotes
1An exception is Miller and Askiri (1976), which studies Brazil and
Chile.
2The early paper of Argy and Kouri (1974) does not fall easily into
either of these categories. See note 7, below, for further discussion.
3The peso was devalued on August 31, 1976.
4See Keynes (1930, vol. 2, P. 309) and Nundell (1963). A key assumption in
deriving this result is that the central hank expandsdomestic credit through
an open—market operation that leaves privatewealth unchanged. If domestic
credit instead represents outside money and the public's deiiandfor money is
a function of its wealth, the capital—account offsetwill not be complete,
even under perfect capital mobility and unlimited assetsubstitutabilitY.
Below, we compute the empirical offset coefficientsassociated with both
types of domestic credit creation.
5Even when foreign and home bonds are imperfect substitutes, the central
bank may be unable to affect the monetary base if government debt is not
outside debt; see Obstfeld (1981) and Stockman (1979). We ignore below the
problems that can arise when the public internalizes the government and
central—bank budget constraints.
6The series are adjusted for reserve requirements as described in the
next section.
7The "reduced—form" capital flow equation, as estimated by Kouri and
Porter (1974), is derived in two steps. First, one writes the change in net
external lending over a quarter as a function of the change in the foreign
and home interest rates and the change in income and other determinants of
the capital account. Second, one eliminates the change in the domestic
interest rate from this equation using the (first—differenced) money—market
equilibrium condition, which relates the quarterly change in (base) money
demand to the sum of the capital account, the current account, and the
increase in central bank domestic assets. Equations that regress changes in
reserves on changes in domestic credit, changes in income, and changes in
the home interest rate (for example, Cardoso and Dornbusch (1980)), are
clearly money—demand equations, and give no information regarding the effect
of credit expansion on the capital account. (See Frerikel, Gylfason, and
Helliwell (1980).) Balance—of—payments equations such as the one estimated
by Connolly and Dantas da Silveira (1979), which are based on the assumption
that money demand and the money supply multiplier are interest inelastic,
assume implicitly that the capital—account offset to domestic credit
expansion is complete. Indeed, when money supply and money demand are both
interest inelastic, the Kouri—Porter capital—flow equation is
under—identified. Identification is lost also when no variables other than
the balance of payments enter the monetary policy reaction function. (This
assumes that no a priori information is available concerning the degree of
correlation between the disturbances of various equations.) If domestic
credit responds systematically to variables other than the balance of
payments, these variables, if predetermined, may be used as instruments in
estimating the "reduced—form" capital—flow equation by two—stage least
squares. This approach, which in principle yields consistent parameter
estimates, was suggested by Argy and Kouri (1974). Their estimated offset
coefficients were generally much smaller than those obtained using ordinary
least squares.8Calculations are based on year—end data published in International
Financial Statistics, lines lad and 1ad.
9The data appendix provides details on the construction of our
central—bank domestic asset series
'°Details on the calculation of the average reserve ratio series used in
this study apear in the appendix.
''All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. Financial
aggregates are measured in billions of pesos.
'2We draw on the discussions of government deficit finance in Brothers
and Solis (1966) and Ortiz and Solis (1979).
'3The standard—error estimates produced by 2S2SLS allow for a non—zero
covariarice between the estimates of the structural parameters and the
estimate of the autoregressive parameter (denoted by p in Table 1). In
addition, 2S2SLS does not require the absence of conditional
heteroskedasticity, an important problem is standard—error estimation when
lagged endogenous variables are used as instruments. Conditional
heteroskedasticity is discussed by Engle (1980) and Hansen (1979), and, in a
cross—sectional context, by White (1980a, l980bL
'4mis seasonality is reflected in the money—demand equation estimated
below.
'5Bhalla (1981) computes a positive correlation between the balance of
paymentsand the change in the money stock using annual data for the period
1956—1972. This evidence also suggests that sterilization was of limited
importancebefore the mid—seventies.
'6Business International (1979) reports that Banco de Mexico has used
Certificados de Tesoreria de la Federacion since 1978 and petrobonds since
1977 to conduct open—market operations. In addition, the move to market
valuation of gold reserves in 1976 allowed greater flexibility in choosing
the rate of domestic credit expansion. Prior to these innovations, the
monetary authority relied on reserve—requirement changes, special deposits,
and operations in government securities within the banking system (see
Brothers and Solrs). Only the last of these was employed with any
frequency.
17The futures premium can be interpretedas an indicator of exchange—rate
expectations or as the cost of forward cover. The two interpretations, of
course, need not conflict. We use the futures premium rather than the
forward premium used by Lizondo (this volume) because there is a longer
series of observations available for the former variable. Jacob Frenkel
has suggested that the futures premium may measure exchange—rate expecta-
tions with error. The two—step two—stage least squares estimates (but not
the Fair's method estimates) reported below yield consistent parameter
estimates even when all asset returns are measured with random, serially—
uncorrelated error. See Cumby, Huiziriga, and Obstfeld (1981) on the pro-
cedure to employ when an equation with errors in variables is corrected for
autoregressive dependence of its structural disturbance.-33--
aroassuming hero that domesticand coveredforeign bonds are
imperfect substitutes because of political risk. See Aliber (1973) and
Dooley and Isard (1980). One example of such political risk arises when
the future tax treatment of international interest payments is uncertain.
19The domestic income variable hada small and very insignificant coef-
ficient.It was therefore omitted from the equation reported in Table 2.
20Domestic wealth has been dropped from theequation, as its coefficient
was small and insignificant. No evidence of serial correlation was found.
21There was no evidence ofa lag in the adjustment of the money supply
to its long—run level.
22Business International (1979) attributes thispractice to the extremely
limited recourse of commercial banks to rediscounting at the central bank.
Generally, only certain export bills are discountable.
23Thecontemporaneous real exchange rate exerted no significant effect
on the futures premium. This is probably the result of lags in the report-
ing of price—level figures.